Iraq Through the "Realist" Lens

Well, here it is, my much "hyped" essay. I got an "A" on it in my international relations class. I will toot my horn: I ROCK! Or is it, I-RACK? Anyway, without further ado, the essay...

Iraq: Through The “Realist” Lens

By David Stupplebeen
Written on 29 September, 2004

In 2003, the United States made the decision to invade Iraq and overthrow its leader, Saddam Hussein. The question that we should be asking is, “By which method were these decisions made?” Analyzing the Iraq war through a “realist” lens gives us an opportunity to determine whether conflict will result with the desired effect. The “realist” lens, as defined by our text, adheres to four main tenets. First, securing our own country’s interest. Second, neither waste power on peripheral goals nor pursue goals that you do not have the power to achieve. Third, countries should practice power of balance politics; and fourth, the best way to maintain peace is to be powerful (Rourke, 2003). Sadly, the Iraq War does not meet these four criteria of “realism,” even though the Bush Administration would have the American public believe this were otherwise.

The first tenet of realism cites that we must secure our country’s best interests (Rourke, 2003). However, have we really secured our country’s best interests by invading Iraq? Two of these interests may very well be spreading democracy or securing stable energy supplies (Zizek, 2004). Although the Bush administration claims the first goal as the main objective, the second is equally plausible. The question, however, is at what cost?

According to a report from the Army War College, we “have stressed the U.S. Army to the breaking point” (Fallows, 2004). Wouldn’t dealing with Iran’s possible nuclear capability and North Korea’s definite nuclear capability be in the better interest of the United States? Secondly, although we are now in quasi-control of the second largest oil reserves of the world, we have yet to totally gain control of these oil fields. Even as recently as 16 September, saboteurs had attacked Iraq’s oil pipelines. This most recent attack had shut down pipelines in Kirkuk, and shut down electricity to much of the country (BBC, 14 Sept 2004).

These examples are not yet the worst of problems when looking at Iraq from a realist perspective. The second tenet, neither waste power on peripheral goals nor pursue goals that you do not have the power to achieve (Rourke, 2003), is only too apparent. The main goal that the Bush Administration now cites as its reason to invade Iraq is to “spread democracy.” While this goal seems nice, and will presumably provide the United States with another “friendly” partner in the Middle East, it couldn’t be further from reality.

Eric Hobsbawm describes the idea of spreading democracy as “not merely quixotic—it is dangerous.” According to Hobsbawm, “the campaign to spread democracy will not succeed.” He further qualifies this statement by using the examples of Northern Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Sri Lanka. “Without consensus,” he states, “there is no single sovereign people and therefore no legitimacy for arithmetical majorities.” In Northern Ireland, this lack of consensus was religious, with Czechoslovakia it was ethnic, and with Sri Lanka, it was both (2004). We can further this train of thought and apply it to Iraq, where we have both religious and ethnic differences. The racial aspect could be characterized as a Kurdish separatist state in the north (Osman, 2003), or a nation divided along the two predominant sects of Islam, Sunni and Shiite (Plett, 2004).

The third tenet of realism requires that countries practice balance of power politics. Unfortunately, this is not the case with Iraq. Previously, the balance of power in the Middle East was skewed with Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Now, this polarization is even more deeply skewed with the United States being in the region, and in the middle geographically, between Israel and Iran.

Iran has now further refused inspections of uranium enrichment facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States and Israel both accuse Iran of using this enrichment for the production of nuclear weapons. The United States has now reportedly shipped 500 “bunker busting” bombs to Israel for the purpose of destroying facilities, presumably nuclear facilities, in Iran. To further this conflict, Iran has now approved a “strategic missile” (BBC, 21, 23, 25 Sept 2004). It is possible to link the possibility that Iran is “defending” its interests by building a nuclear weapon to the United States’ presence in the Middle East. With the advent of Iran’s nuclear capability, we could have a multi-polar system, and one that could be heavily skewed. While continuing problems in Iraq could compromise U.S. military capability, Israel could easily launch an attack against Iran through Iraq (and presumably “friendly” airspace). The military pole would heavily weigh in the U.S.-Israeli favor. But, this could lead to further fractionalization on the ground in Iraq, not to mention religious unrest in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan—all three nations with vested U.S. interest—when those countries examine the U.S.-Israel relationship.

The fourth and final tenet of realism, to maintain peace is to be powerful, is a misnomer in this particular war. In the beginning of the Iraq War, Americans, and for that matter, the rest of the world, watched the U.S. troops roll into Baghdad and crush the Saddam Regime. From there, our president claimed “mission accomplished,” while landing on the deck of an aircraft carrier. Unfortunately, this show of power has not garnered us peace.

Even as recently as this past week, conservative columnist Robert Novak claimed that a quick exit strategy was likely. According to a Novak column, “This determination [to leave Iraq] is not predicated on success in implanting Iraqi democracy and internal stability.” He continues, “Rather, the officials are saying: Ready or not, here we go” (2004). This only begs the question as to what power this war demonstrated, and if we go into sovereign nations at will, remove their leaders at will, wouldn’t other countries such as Iran be justified in building nuclear weapons?

Unfortunately, the quagmire that is Iraq is a swamp from which a “normal” U.S. foreign policy may never emerge. The problems that we have caused, not just to ourselves as a nation, or to the people of a region on the other side of the world, or to the world itself, may now be beyond repair. Even this week, the dire specter of civil war in Iraq came to a head in a CIA report (Hendawi, 2004). Further, it has been shown this week that intelligence given our president two months prior to the invasion outlined the troubles the U.S. is having there currently in an almost clairvoyant fashion (Jehl & Sanger, 2004).

Although hindsight is always perfect, if the powers that be had looked at the options before them through a realist lens, they could have seen, perhaps, a little into the future, and perhaps had avoided the Iraq War to begin with. Now with the danger of Iraq slipping into civil war, and the possibility of regional warfare, the Bush administration must act quickly to improve the situation in Iraq. However, this opportunity may have already slipped away.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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